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T
Michael Sandel's critique of the public philosophy of contemporary United
States liberalism is almost enough to make me a liberal.' Sandel aims his
criticisms at what he calls liberalism's procedural republic, but many miss their
target. The procedural republic has more going for it than Sandel is willing to
concede: A sensible and defensible liberal public philosophy covers nearly the
whole terrain with which Sandel is concerned, and more. Sandel believes that
he has described an alternative to such a philosophy, but much of what he
recommends is entirely compatible with a sensible liberal public philosophy.
Sometimes his prescriptions are so ill-defined that one might read into the
project more than is there. Moreover, to the extent that some of his
recommendations clearly differ from what a sensible liberal public philosophy
would recommend, they are of questionable value. Nevertheless, the procedural
republic is indeed inadequate. It lacks the resources, some of which Sandel
identifies, to deal with one important source to contemporary discontent: the
concentration of economic power in transnational corporations, which deprives
United States citizens of important powers of self-governance.
* Professor of Government, Harvard University.
Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law. Georgetown ULni'crst, La% Center I %,ould
like to thank Anita Allen and Milton C. Regan for their comments on a draft of this Reiec
1. "Liberalism" is of course a contested term. For one definition. see Ronald Beiner. What Liberalism
Means, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 190, 198 (1996) (-A liberal is someone who celebrates modermity
wholeheartedly as emancipatory. An antiliberal is someone who is at least somewhhat anxious about the
quality of this emancipation, and who worries about the price we have to pay for being culturally
.emancipated."'). On this definition, I am an antiliberal.
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After providing an introduction to Sandel's argument in Part I, I go on to
raise three questions about some of its main components. Part II examines
Sandel's effort to identify the public philosophy that reigns in the
contemporary United States. Section II.A questions whether Sandel fairly
educes such a public philosophy from legal sources; Section II.B suggests that
Sandel's reading of United States history to discern our public philosophy
oversimplifies that history's complex reality; and Section II.C argues that
Sandel's criticisms of John Rawls's version of liberalism as a political
philosophy are misplaced, but that Sandel's description of a public philosophy
may nonetheless be accurate.
Part III stands back from the substantive details of Sandel's work and
locates it socially. I argue that Democracy's Discontent offers us a version of
what sociologist Charles Derber calls "the communitarianism of the
professional middle class." 2 Democracy's Discontent's failure to offer an
adequate account of how to achieve popular control of an economy
characterized by transnational economic power coheres with the position of
that class, which itself both hopes for such control and has few resources with
which to achieve it. Part IV elaborates on an idea of federalism and local
control that plays an important but vague role in Sandel's exposition. Section
IV.A argues that federalism may provide an entry into developing an idea of
complex cosmopolitanism as a public philosophy that might address the
economic questions discussed in Part III, and Section IV.B applies that idea
of complex cosmopolitanism to the issue of gay rights.
Democracy's Discontent is a rich and interesting work. It is particularly
valuable in its emphasis on the way in which economic debates are not merely
about economic growth and distributive justice but are also about the political
conditions that flow from our economic arrangements. The criticisms I offer
are serious and sometimes severe. They do not diminish the book's importance
in helping us understand how we might go about achieving popular control
over economic power in today's world. Sandel has identified, not democracy's
discontent, but the discontent of-and the alternative public philosophy desired
by-an important contemporary social class. His diagnosis may be sound, even
if his prescription proves weak.
I. AN OVERVIEW
Democracy's Discontent identifies, criticizes, and offers an alternative to
our "public philosophy." A public philosophy is not a form of systematic
political philosophy. Rather, it is the philosophy "implicit in our practices and
2. Charles Derber, Coming Glued: Communitarianism to the Rescue, TIKKUN, July-Aug. 1993, at 27,
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institutions. 3 The nature of my criticisms makes it important that readers have
a complete sense of his argument's overall form and content.
Sandel divides his analysis into two parts. The first examines a range of
contemporary political and legal issues, primarily as they have been dealt with
by the Supreme Court. Here Sandel finds that our practices express a
commitment to what he calls the procedural republic, whose "central idea is
that government should be neutral toward the moral and religious views its
citizens espouse" and "should provide a framework of rights that respects
persons as free and independent selves, capable of choosing their own values
and ends."4 But, Sandel argues, government really "cannot be neutral toward
the values and ends its citizens espouse."5 Instead of constructing a procedural
republic, government should pursue "a formative politics, a politics that
cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires."' This
"republican" politics may better promote liberty than the procedural republic,
because the dominant public philosophy "cannot inspire the sense of
community and civic engagement that liberty requires.
The longer, second part of Democracy's Discontent surveys United States
history with a general and a more specific aim. The former is to establish that
the nation's public philosophy pursued formative projects of various sorts until
the public philosophy of the procedural republic recently attained dominance.
The latter is to show that each of those formative projects recognized the
impact of economic arrangements on citizenship and civic virtue.
Sandel begins with a quick survey of political theory. Liberalism, he says,
rests on an appealing "image of the self as free and independent,
unencumbered by aims and attachments it does not choose for itself' and on
"the case it implies for equal respect... ". Despite its powerful appeal,"
however, "the image of the unencumbered self is flawed" because "lilt cannot
make sense of our moral experience" of "moral ties that may claim us for
reasons unrelated to a choice." 9 Rather, a public philosophy must acknowledge
that "we think of ourselves as encumbered selves, already claimed by certain
projects and commitments."'"
3. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DIscoNTET.T: AMERICA IN SEARCII OF A PL BLIC PHILOSOPHtY
at ix (1996).
4. Id. at 4. For Sandel. the procedural republic is inadequate in part because "'libcrt. depends on
sharing self-government," which "requires more than the capacity to choose one's ends and to respect
others' right to do the same.... To share in self-rule ... requires that citizens possess. or come to acquire.
certain qualities of character, or civic virtues." Id. at 5-6.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 12.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 14. 1 confine to this footnote the observation that one might reasonably question restrcting
the analysis of public philosophy to "citizens." For a collection doing so suth reference to political theory
and economics, see JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION (Warren Schwartz ed.. 1995). Sandel does not discuss current
controversies over immigration policy. He does reject cnrticisms of republican theories as necessanly
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The next chapter provides an equally quick overview of our constitutional
history, arguing that the modem "priority of individual rights, the ideal of
neutrality, and the conception of persons as freely choosing, unencumbered
selves"" is a relatively recent development in the United States. The Lochner
era marked this change: "For the first time in American history, rights
functioned as trumps. Liberty no longer depended on dispersed power alone,
but found direct protection from the courts.' 2 "[L]ater courts," drawing
inspiration from dissents by Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone and Justices
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, "install[ed] the priority of right
in the further sense of the Constitution as a framework of rights that is neutral
among ends."' 3 Sandel concludes this survey by discussing the Supreme
Court's flag salute cases. In denying government the power to require school
children to salute the flag, the Court committed itself to the view that
"[p]atriotism would be a matter of choice, not of inculcation, a voluntary act
by free and independent selves .... With West Virginia v. Barnette, the
procedural republic had arrived."'
' 4
The succeeding two chapters examine constitutional issues involving
religious liberty, free speech, privacy, and policy issues such as divorce.
Establishment Clause doctrine stressing the government's duty of neutrality
among religions and between religion and nonreligion naturally attracts
Sandel's attention. Even dissenters spoke "in the name of neutrality,"" and
when the Court has upheld religious practices like a municipal creche, "it has
taken pains to maintain that the religious aspect is only incidental."' 6 The
Court's recent cases turn on "the right to choose [religious] beliefs
themselves."'' 7 On this view, the Constitution commands not "respect for
exclusionary. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 319 ("I]he assumption that the capacity for virtue is
incorrigible, tied to roles or identities fixed in advance, is not intrinsic to republican political theory."). Yet
I wonder whether this happy conclusion is entirely compatible with Sandel's insistence that people have
encumbered selves, constituted by "those loyalties and responsibilities whose moral force consists partly
in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we
are-as members of this family or city or nation or people." Id. at 14 (emphasis added). I wonder whether
corrigibility might not require some, either those presently citizens or those seeking to become citizens, to
separate themselves from their identities as members of particular nations.
11. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 28.
12. Id. at 42.
13. Id. at 43. Holmes insisted, for example, "not only that judges should refrain from imposing their
morality on the Constitution, but also that the Constitution itself refuses to endorse any particular morality."
Id. at 45. Chief Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), then "offered a basis for rights consistent with the idea of the Constitution as
neutral among ends." SANDEL, supra note 3, at 49. Within his framework, "arguments would not be about
the intrinsic value of the interests the rights protect, but rather about the constraints appropriate to an open
political process, free of prejudice, within which people can choose their values for themselves." Id.
14. Id. at 54.
15. Id. at 59.
16. Id. at 60. As Sandel sees it, the Court's more modem cases rest not so much on an older argument
that "neutrality is best for both religion and the state," but on a "voluntarist argument" stressing "'individual
choice in matters of religion."' Id. at 62-63 (quoting Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A
Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CI. L. REV. 805, 806 (1978)).
17. Id. at 63.
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religion, but respect for the self whose religion it is, or respect for the dignity
that consists in the capacity to choose one's religion freely."'" This, however,
"is inadequate to the liberty it promises. . . .Not all religious beliefs can be
redescribed without loss as 'the product of free and voluntary choice by the
faithful."" 9
Sandel's discussion of free speech law again unsurprisingly focuses on the
doctrine of content neutrality. That doctrine is "a recent development," 0
which, according to Sandel, displaced an earlier "two-level" theory in which
some speech was strongly protected and other speech was unprotected. "The
erosion of the two-level theory relieves the Court of the task of assigning
values to various categories of speech, and so signals the rise of neutrality as
a principle of First Amendment jurisprudence." 2' This development was
accompanied by a shift in theoretical emphasis within free speech law:
Theories treating speech as essential to self-government were displaced by
theories treating speech as essential to self-expression.
The liberal theory of "personhood and speech," Sandel concludes, is "open
to at least two objections": First, protecting racist speech or "violent
pornographic depictions ... may fail to respect persons as members of the
particular communities to which they belong, and on whose status their social
esteem may largely depend," and second, "enforcing the theory that speech...
never constitutes social practices fails to acknowledge the injuries that speech
can inflict independent of the physical harm it may cause." '" To the liberal
response that the point of constitutional restraints is to limit self-government,
Sandel replies that sometimes attention to content may actually promote
liberty. In support, he cites a decision by District Judge Frank Johnson
allowing a protest march at least in part on the content-based ground that the
marchers were seeking to promote civil rights.:
18. Id. at 63-64.
19. Id. at 65 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. 38.53 (1985)) Sandel acknou ledges that decisions
requiring governments to accommodate religious practices do 'accord[] greater respect to the claims of
encumbered selves," id. at 68, but notes the Court's retreat from a doctrine of mandator) accommodation.
which he explains by the procedural republic's difficulty in "distinguishling) betvecn claims of conscience
on the one hand and personal preferences and desires on the other." id. at 70 Sandel also notes statutor)
accommodations of religion, see id. at 70-71. but he does not use such accommodations, and the Supreme
Court's decisions finding some of them constitutional, to identify a different public philosophy "implicit
in our practices," id. at ix.
20. Id. at 72.
21. Id. at 73-74.
22. See id. at 79-80. Sandel uses controversies over group defamation and arguments against
pornography made by some feminists to show that constitutional law cannot and should not ask "a
community to 'bracket' its disapproval of the content of speech. howeer odious the speech ma) be " Id
at 81.
23. Id. at 89. In addition, "protecting speech by insisting that local communities bracket moral
judgments carries costs for self-government" because "it... prevents political communities from acting
democratically to realize" the good of "respect for persons as situated selses." Id.
24. See id. at 90 (citing Williams v. Wallace. 240 F Supp. 100, 106. 108 (M.D Ala 1965))
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Sandel's discussion of privacy rights and family sounds similar themes.
Privacy rights have become "tied ... to voluntarist assumptions,"' even
though Griswold v. Connecticut,6 the foundation of the modem law of
constitutional privacy, was "based on a substantive moral judgment" about the
sanctity of marriage. 7 The shift to autonomy, Sandel claims, came in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 which treated marriage and other forms of sexual
congress as a mere association of individuals. The abortion cases show the
failings of the procedural republic's attempt to bracket moral issues-for
abortion, the question of when life begins-because the Court's decision
actually "presupposed a particular answer to the question" it purported to
bracket.29 Bowers v. Hardwick3" is, like the permissible accommodation
cases, an embarrassment for Sandel's account, but Sandel turns it to his
purposes by arguing that prior privacy law, by resting on voluntarist
assumptions, deprived defenders of gay rights of the ability to make arguments
that homosexual intimacy was a substantive good just as heterosexual marriage
was.
31
Sandel concludes the first part of Democracy's Discontent with a look at
modern family law. No-fault divorce law exemplifies the elimination of
substantive moral judgments in the procedural republic: "Instead of concerning
themselves with guilt or innocence, the courts now employ such
'nonjudgmental' criteria as the economic needs and resources of the
parties. 32 Sandel's criticisms of this development, stressing the economic
hardships now faced by divorced women and their children, are more
pragmatic than his objections to the rise of the procedural republic elsewhere.
He does point out that modem divorce law "fails to respect mothers and
homemakers of traditional marriages whose identity is constituted by their
roles," because "it penalizes women whose economic reliance on their
husbands expressed the mutual dependence of traditional marital roles. 33
Returning to the economic theme, Sandel argues that liberal ideals of self-
25. Id. at 92.
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 96.
28. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
29. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 101. Sandel also observes that one could bracket the question by
leaving the decision to individual women or to local governments: "Even given agreement to bracket an
intractable moral or religious controversy for the sake of social cooperation, it may still be unclear what
counts as bracketing." Id. at 102-03. Sandel does not here treat the "individual" woman making a decision
as herself encumbered. On this view, insisting that the decision to have or not have an abortion belongs
to the woman need not entail the view that women making that decision are unencumbered selves. To the
extent that Roe v. Wade itself repeatedly referred to a decision jointly made by a woman and her physician,
see 410 U.S. 113, 121, 164 (1973), it might be taken to conceptualize the choice as socially situated and
at least to some degree encumbered.
30. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
31. See SANDEL, supra note 3 at 104-08.
32. Id. at 109.
33. Id. at 113.
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sufficiency "make some ways of life more difficult '"" in part "[bly making
dependence a dangerous thing." 35 The "unilateral" nature of divorce, "the
rejection of marital roles tied to lifelong obligations, and the emphasis on self-
sufficiency after divorce all reflect the liberal conception of persons as
unencumbered selves independent of their roles and unbound by moral ties
they choose to reject.
3 6
Part II of Democracy's Discontent explores how "the civic strand of
economic argument '37 was expressed in United States history until recently.
It is a story of decline: Today our discussions of economic policy "revolve
around two considerations: prosperity and fairness," but in the past, "the civic
consequences of economic policy ... often loomed large in American political
discourse."3
Sandel's analysis of U.S. history starts with Jefferson, who "argued against
developing large-scale domestic manufactures on the grounds that the agrarian
way of life makes for virtuous citizens, well suited to self-government." 9 The
Founders pursued two programs, "one formative, the other procedural. The first
sought, through education and other means, to inculcate virtue more
strenuously. The second sought, through constitutional change, to render virtue
less necessary."40 Sandel's account of the Founding era will be familiar to
those who have followed the discussion of republicanism by contemporary
constitutional theorists. Economic debate, including debate over domestic
manufactures, dominated political discourse during the early republic, but this
debate "was not only about national wealth and distributive justice; it was also
about the civic consequences of economic arrangements-about the kind of
society America should become and the kind of citizens it should cultivate."'
Partisans on both sides argued that their programs would produce citizens with
characters appropriate to self-governance.42 Jacksonian political and economic
theory stressed the importance of artisan independence, and opposed the
concentration of economic power because it made corruption more likely and
"undermin[ed] the moral qualities republican citizenship requires. '" 3
"[E]conomic growth and distributive justice" mattered, but primarily because
they were "means to competing visions of a self-governing republic."
34. Id. at 114.
35. Id. at 115.
36. Id. at 112. Sandel's argument would have been strengthened. I behee. had he incorporated the
more subtle treatment of no-fault divorce laws in MILTON C. REGAN JR . FAmILY LAW AND THE P1 RSL IT
OF INTIMACY 137-52 (1993).
37. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 124.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 124-25.
40. Id. at 129. The Constitution itself was primanly part of the second program
41. Id. at 133.
42. See, e.g., id. at 142-47.
43. Id. at 157.
44. Id. Sandel uses debates over the recharter of the Bank of the United States and Henry Clay's
proposals for internal economic development to convey this interpretation of the penod See id. at 157-63
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Sandel's overview of the late nineteenth century notes that increasing
industrialization led to new understandings of economics and civic virtue.
Abolitionists, followed by advocates for the industrial working classes,
promoted free labor partly because people should have the right to choose their
own paths; they also stressed that labor, even in an industrial setting, was "a
temporary stage on the way to independence" as an artisan, entrepreneur, or
farmer.45 In the end, however, industrial development induced a change in the
terms of public discussion. The republican ideals were muted, and a voluntarist
conception-that workers must be allowed to contract freely on their own
terms as expressions of their autonomous selves-began to dominate. This
change was exacerbated by judges in the Lochner era who articulated a
strongly voluntarist vision of economic life. "With the acceptance of wage
labor as a permanent condition came a shift in American legal and political
discourse from the civic to the voluntarist conception of freedom.
46
Nevertheless, the procedural republic was not yet complete. The
Progressive era, according to Sandel, saw a resurgence of interest in the
relation between economic policy and self-government. During that period,
Sandel believes, the discontent, frustration, and sense of disempowerment that
characterize contemporary politics truly took hold. As bureaucracies and other
large organizations came to dominate what became an urban landscape,
Progressives attempted to revitalize the civic vision of economic policy: "[T]he
lack of fit between the way people conceived their identities and the way
economic life was actually organized gave rise to fears for the prospect of self-
government., 47 Like the Founders, Progressives pursued a formative and a
procedural program. The procedural program sought to enhance the power of
professionals and thereby to make government "less dependent on virtue
among the people."48 But their proposals for urban reform, including the
creation of urban parks to promote neighborliness, also were efforts "to elevate
the moral and civic character of citizens."49 Progressives sought to enhance
national governmental power to combat concentrations of private wealth. At
the same time, they also attempted to disperse power by preventing the
incursion of concentrated economic strength into local communities, as when
they opposed the growth of chain stores and hoped that antitrust law would
preserve other small businesses.50
Eventually, however, the civic ambition faded, and public debates about
economic policy came to express the far more limited "consumerist vision,"
45. Id. at 169. For example, proponents of the eight-hour day argued that the time made available
could be used for participation in government. See id. at 191-92.
46. Id. at 200.
47. Id. at 205.
48. Id. at 208.
49. Id. at 209.
50. See id. at 227-49.
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in which public policy sought to promote the ability of each person to choose
autonomously whatever she or he wished.5 The Keynesian revolution in
economic policy confirmed the shift to the procedural republic with its
exclusive emphasis on growth and distributive justice.52 Growth was an
uncontroversial goal compared to restructuring the economy, and even concern
for distributive justice came to rest on a desire to promote growth and ensure
the ability of all to be autonomous consumers.
The procedural republic had its "moment of mastery"5 3 in the years after
World War II, when the United States experienced high levels of material
prosperity and economic and political hegemony in the West. But President
John F. Kennedy's New Frontier was "a monument to a fading vision of
American power and will, a final expression of the mid-century moment when
Americans viewed themselves as masters of their destiny."'' The postwar
welfare state grew, but it rested primarily on the view that "[c]ertain material
conditions were prerequisites for the freedom of each person to choose his
ends for himself,"55 not on "an expansive sense of national community."
'5
As a result, "Americans found to their frustration that they were losing
control of the forces that governed their lives."5 7 We came to fear "'the loss
of self-government and the erosion of community," and the "reigning political
agenda, with its attenuated civic resources, was unable to answer or even
address" them.58 Sandel then surveys recent political history-from the
unsuccessful candidacies of George Wallace and Robert Kennedy to the
successful one of Ronald Reagan-to show how some politicians responded
to the impoverishment of the civic discourse in the procedural republic by
invoking republican themes and reasserting the hope that government could
pursue a formative project. But, Sandel concludes, even Reagan "governed
more as market conservative than as civic conservative .... Not surprisingly,
Americans' frustration with politics continued to mount."5 9
Sandel's final chapter mentions, but does not truly address, the concern
that his analysis is "tinged with nostalgia."' He gives more attention to the
argument that republicanism is unattractive because it is necessarily exclusive
51. See id. at 221-27.
52. See id. at 261-62. Keynesian policy allowed public officials "a way to 'bracket.' or set aside.
controversial conceptions of the good life . land] denied gocmmcni a stake in the moral character of
its citizens." Id.
53. Id. at 275.
54. Id. at 277.
55. Id. at 281.
56. Id. at 280. For example, welfare rights litigators objected to efforts to use public assistance "to
regulate the moral character of welfare recipients." id. at 286. and reform proposals culminated in efforts
to ensure a guaranteed income, which would have confirmed that public assistance had purely economic
and not civic, moral, or other formative goals.
57. Id. at 294.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 315.
60. Id. at 317.
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and coercive. Sandel denies the first charge, but acknowledges that "[a]s the
tendency to exclusion recedes .... the danger of coercion looms larger.",
6
1
Although "[r]epublican politics is risky politics, a politics without
guarantees, '62 it is better than the alternatives offered by the procedural
republic, which have led to our present state of discontent with politics. "A
politics that brackets morality and religion too completely soon generates its
own disenchantment," 63 and its own serious pathologies, "creat[ing] a moral
void that opens the way for intolerance and other misguided moralisms. '
Sandel takes some comfort in recent efforts by conservatives and some
Democrats, including Bill Clinton, to reconstitute and reform public policy
with a new formative project, which he calls "the recrudescence of virtue. 65
Sandel's final pages are surprisingly muted. The problem he identifies is
serious: A contemporary political economy must address the fact that the
economy is now organized on a global scale. "We cannot hope to govern the
global economy without transnational political institutions, and we cannot
expect to sustain such institutions without cultivating more expansive civic
identities. 66 But Sandel doubts that this can happen. In light of the difficulty
Americans have in generating allegiance even to our own national institutions,
Sandel thinks it unlikely that supranational institutions could generate loyalty:
"If the nation cannot summon more than a minimal commonality, it is unlikely
",67that the global community can do better .... Rather, sovereignty must be
dispersed, not "relocated" upward.68 Without explication, Sandel invites us
"to consider the unrealized possibilities implicit in American federalism."69
Democracy's Discontent concludes with a sermon. After noting that
"multiply-encumbered citizens are prone [to] the drift to formless, protean,
storyless selves, 70 Sandel writes:
Since human beings are storytelling beings, we are bound to rebel
against the drift to storylessness. But there is no guarantee that the
rebellions will take salutary form. Some, in their hunger for story, will
be drawn to the vacant, vicarious fare of confessional talk shows,
celebrity scandals, and sensational trials. Others will seek refuge in
fundamentalism. The hope of our time rests instead with those who
can summon the conviction and restraint to make sense of our
condition and repair the civic life on which democracy depends.
7'
61. Id. at 319.
62. Id. at 321.
63. Id. at 322.
64. Id. at 323.
65. Id. at 324.
66. Id. at 345.
67. Id. at 346.
68. See id. at 345.
69. Id. at 347.
70. Id. at 350.
71. Id. at 351.
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II. IDENTIFYING "OUR" PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
Quick: Who is Wayne Dyer? If you do not know, you may not understand
the public philosophy that prevailed in the 1970s. Sandel explicates the social
thought of pop psychologist Dr. Dyer-"a best-selling author of the
1970s" 72 -- to show how "the liberating promise of the voluntarist conception
of freedom assumed its most extravagant form."" On reading Sandel's
analysis of Dr. Dyer's writings,74 which seemed accurate enough to me, I
wondered why Dr. Dyer exemplified the nation's public philosophy. Why not
Billy Graham instead, a person who regularly appeared on lists of Americans'
most admired figures,75 or Marabel Morgan, author of the antifeminist book,
The Total Woman? 76 Dr. Dyer's appearance in Democracy's Discontent raises
questions about the methods Sandel uses to identify the nation's public
philosophy. In the end, these questions do not invalidate his analysis, but they
do, I believe, call for its reformulation.
A. A Lawyer's Quibbles
Sandel uses Supreme Court cases to illustrate the nation's public
philosophy, whose principles he extracts from the cases. His interpretation of
the cases might raise a lawyer's eyebrows occasionally, because Sandel
sometimes disregards institutional or doctrinal reasons for adopting a rule. 7
Sandel instead uses the cases to illuminate a public philosophy. A lawyer's
reservations need not impair the utility of the cases for Sandel's purposes: If
the public takes the cases to mean what Sandel says, the fact that lawyers
might see them differently is irrelevant. One might ask for survey evidence to
support Sandel's claims. But Sandel's use of Dr. Dyer shows that he is as
much a "culture critic" as a social scientist. He asks readers to ask themselves
whether his description of our culture resonates with their experience. I argue
in Part III that it resonates with an important segment of Sandel's readership.
For example, Sandel takes the free speech doctrine of content neutrality to
show that "government must be neutral among competing conceptions of the
good. '"78 Free speech doctrine before "the last few decades" 9 distinguished
72. Id. at 292.
73. Id.
74. See id. at 292-93.
75. Cf WILLIAM MARTIN, PROPHET WiTH HONOR: THE BILLY GRAHAM STORY 266 (1991) (noting
that by 1960, Graham was "one of the best known and most widel) admired men in the world"). id at 383
("In the 1970 list of men most admired by Americans. Billy Graham placed second, right behind Richard
Nixon and just ahead of Spiro Agnew.").
76. MARABEL MORGAN, THE TOTAL WOMAN (1973).
77. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (describing Sandel's treatment of statutes and cases
involving permissible accommodations of religion).
78. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 71.
79. Id. at 72.
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between high and low value speech. "The erosion of the two-level theory
relieves the Court of the task of assigning values to various categories of
speech, and so signals the rise of neutrality as a principle of First Amendment
jurisprudence."8 For Sandel, even decisions allowing restrictions on speech,
such as the Court's obscenity decisions since 1973, "display[] the powerful
influence of neutrality assumptions on constitutional law."'" The Court's
modern approach to obscenity refrains from allowing states to proscribe it on
purely moral grounds, but instead insists, "sometimes implausibly,"8 2 on
identifying "a purpose that [does] not involve a substantive moral judgment
against obscenity as such, 83 including such interests as preserving a
neighborhood's character.
A lawyer would find these doctrines less significant than does Sandel.
Although the Court has indeed eroded the sharp distinction between high value
speech, which is strongly protected, and low value speech, which in earlier
doctrine was completely unprotected, distinctions among types of speech
continue to pervade First Amendment doctrine. Different tests apply to
different kinds of speech, and the rationale for the differences continues to be
that some speech is more valuable than other speech.
The Court has sometimes justified the erosion of the sharp distinction
between well-protected high value speech and unprotected low value speech
on the ground that "low" value speech-such as speech simply proposing a
lawful commercial transaction-may be as valuable as, or more valuable than,
classic political speech. 4 But the Court did not eliminate that distinction
entirely because it believed it impermissible to distinguish among types of
speech based on their content or, as the doctrinal jargon has it, their subject
matter.85 The Court's doctrinal change rested in part on its belief that a more
varied series of tests was needed to capture the variety of considerations
relevant to free speech doctrine. One of those considerations was that
legislatures are particularly prone to err-to overestimate the costs of allowing
speech-when they make judgments about the relative value of different forms
of speech.8 6 It is not that distinctions among forms of speech are senseless,
80. Id. at 73-74.
81. Id. at 73.
82. Id. at 76.
83. Id.
84. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763-64
(1976).
85. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978).
86. As John Hart Ely writes:
Courts must police inhibitions on expression and other political activity because we cannot trust
elected official to do so.... (O]ne whose continued authority depends on the silencing of other
voices may well in all good faith be able to convince himself that a reason a more objective
observer would label inadequate is in fact compelling.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 106-07 (1980).
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but rather that we ought to be careful about licensing specific institutions to
draw such distinctions.
An example is Sandel's discussion of the Supreme Court's adult theater
zoning cases. Although Sandel assimilates them to the Court's obscenity cases,
the zoning cases involve nonobscene sexually explicit material. One might
believe that obscenity is "immoral as such,""7 and that nonobscene sexually
explicit material is not, or is not quite as, immoral. The result might be
something like the Court's doctrine, which insists on some evidence, albeit
modest, that the availability of nonobscene sexually explicit material in a
particular location causes some "secondary" effects independent of the
underlying moral judgment. Here too, the Court's doctrine is less driven by
content neutrality than Sandel suggests.8s
Similarly, Sandel emphasizes the Supreme Court's notorious peyote case,
Employment Division v. Smith,89 according to which the Court "attempt[ed]
to avoid substantive moral judgments" entailed by a test that balances "the
moral weight of the governmental interest at stake and the nature of the burden
that interest may impose on certain religious practices."'  That argument,
however, was not an argument about a general public philosophy. Rather, it
was about the specific institutional incapacities of courts, particularly their
inability to determine which religious practices were central to a person's or
religion's belief system. Indeed, the Court could hardly have commended
legislative accommodations as it did had it believed it improper to strike a
balance that took competing moral interests into account. The Court's position,
then, encourages legislatures to make the kinds of substantive moral judgments
that Sandel argues are banished from the procedural republic.9 '
In an important sense, however, I have been offering parochial quibbles
about Sandel's analysis. He is concerned with the nation's public philosophy,
which is constituted in part by the public understanding of Supreme Court
decisions rather than by the specialized intricacies of particular doctrines. So,
if the public, or Sandel as its interpreter, takes the Supreme Court decisions to
87. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 76.
88. The real obscenity cases are even harder for Sandel to explain. He acknowledges that Chicf Justice
Burger's opinion in Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton I appears to allow states to make some at least
quasimoral judgment that obscene material .intrudes upon us all."' Id. at 77 (quoting 413 U.S. 49. 59
(1973) (quoting Alexander Bickel, 22 PUB. INER, , Winter 1971. at 25. 25-26)). Sandel %,ntes that
Burger appeared "reluctant to admit that his argument allowed states to affirm a particular conception of
the good." Id. But, as Sandel points out, this reluctance "undercuts the coherence of Burger's argument.-
Id. Burger made the moral argument anyway. See Paris Adult Theatre 1. 413 U.S. at 63.
89. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
90. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 70.
91. After mentioning the adoption of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Sandel writes: "But the
way the constitutional law of religion has unfolded over the past half-century sheds light on the liberal
political theory it came to express." Id. at 70-71. I would think that the Act has some bearing on
identifying today's public philosophy (and even on contemporary constitutional law if one believes. as I
do, that some statutes have some bearing on constitutional law), but Sandel does not assimilate the Act into
his account.
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mean what Sandel says they mean, his description of a public philosophy
would be accurate even if his description of the Court's opinions might not
satisfy a lawyer. Of course, professionalist criticisms like the ones I have
offered, sometimes bolstered by forthright Supreme Court opinions, might
displace the public understanding Sandel describes. That, however, would itself
amount to a transformation of our public philosophy, although perhaps not the
one Sandel desires.
B. Public Philosophy and Political Culture in U.S. History
Reading Democracy's Discontent, one gradually notices an interesting
trope: U.S. history is replete with "decisive moments." "The shift to the
voluntarist understanding of free labor [after the Civil War] ... mark[ed] a
decisive moment in America's journey .... 92 The late 1930s was "the
moment when our economic questions displaced theirs."93 Sandel notes that
"liberal assumptions displaced the civic strand of economic argument" after
World War 11. 9' Yet these moments may not have been so decisive after all.
In the early 1960s, for example, "even as Kennedy challenged Americans...
the civic resources of American life were becoming attenuated; the political
economy of citizenship was losing its hold." 95 A few years later, Lyndon
Johnson's "conception of citizenship" provided "[o]ne expression of the drift
to the procedural republic. 96 Decisive moments or drift: How did we get to
where we are?
Sandel's survey of U.S. history resembles what Robert W. Gordon called,
in a slightly different context, a "bus tour through the city in which [readers]
have lived their adult lives, 97 with the author as tour guide pointing out the
major attractions: We get brief glimpses of famous figures in U.S. history, with
thumbnail sketches of some portions of their views. These sketches capture
something about Sandel's subjects, but he rarely offers an extended analysis
of anyone's thought as a whole. Occasionally, he struggles to overcome the
patent reductionism of his approach.
His treatment of Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society is probably the
best example of this difficulty. Sandel could hardly deny that Johnson appealed
to "the ideal of national community" in his Great Society rhetoric. 98 As
Sandel points out, Johnson regularly "described the nation as 'a family,"' a
metaphor that Sandel accurately says "would recur in Democratic rhetoric for
92. Id. at 171.
93. Id. at 250.
94. Id. at 279.
95. Id. at 277 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 283 (emphasis added).
97. Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 903, 904 (1981) (reviewing 0. EDWARD
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980)).
98. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 282.
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a generation."99 This "might seem ... to set [Johnson] apart from the
liberalism of the procedural republic."' °  But not "[o]n closer
inspection."' 0' First, Johnson's "call to national community was more
abstract and hortatory" than earlier efforts, which "had sought to shape the
character of citizens through concrete practices and institutions."'02 Second,
Johnson's vision was nationalist: "[Plerfecting the unity of the nation meant
encouraging Americans to set aside or rise above identities tied to region, race,
religion, or class."'0 3 Finally, Johnson defended his programs against
conservative attacks by arguing that the programs would liberate individuals
to choose and that "economic security is a prerequisite for individual
liberty. ' 04
Sandel's attempt to force the Great Society into the mold of the procedural
republic seems to fail. Great Society programs were not either exemplars of
the procedural republic or a revival of Progressive-era commitments to a
formative project. They were a complicated blend of both. As Sandel notes, the
War on Poverty "sought to enlarge the civic capacity of the poor by
encouraging their participation in antipoverty programs at the local level.""
True, the program's ability to accomplish that goal was limited by political
circumstances and Johnson's own ambivalence, but it was an institutional
commitment, though a constrained one, to a formative project. In the
circumstances of the 1960s, Johnson's "vision of national community-'11 was
specifically aimed at challenging the racism that he understood to be based in
the very region he called home. Finally, the Great Society's welfare programs
resurrected the notion that economic security was a prerequisite not only to
individual choice, but also to civic participation.
As Eric Foner notes, "[i]t is easy for a historian to raise questions about
Sandel's account of the past."'0 7 Foner mentions Sandel's "tendency to see
republicanism and liberalism as ideologies that flourished sequentially, with
one replacing the other, rather than outlooks coexisting throughout our
history."' ' Sandel's treatment of the Great Society illustrates this difficulty.
Foner's observation raises a broader question about the nature of Sandel's
analysis. Suppose a more accurate account of U.S. history shows that at nearly
every moment, some significant political figures were committed to one or





103. Id. at 283.
104. Id. at 283-84.
105. Id. at 283.
106. Id.
107. Eric Foner, Liberalism's Discontents. NATION. May 6. 1996. at 36.
108. Id.
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express the values of the procedural republic. In what sense would we then
have had a public philosophy? One possibility is quantitative: The nation's
public philosophy would be whatever most of some relevant population-elite
thinkers? political activists? the public?-adhered to most of the time. Sandel's
way of identifying a public philosophy is obviously ill-suited to such a
quantitative task.
Another possibility is that Sandel is proposing an interpretive account of
U.S. history, which he commends to us on grounds other than its historical
accuracy. Sometimes authors propose interpretive accounts of a nation's history
on the ground that they offer an attractive background against which we can
place ourselves. Sandel appears to have a different aim in mind. The story he
offers has its elements of grandeur, but mostly it is pervaded by a nostalgic
yearning for a better time. The implicit appeal is this: We should accept his
interpretive account because if we do, we will become better people by
emulating those who promoted formative projects.
Hence, Sandel's history actually functions as a fervent exhortation. It
succeeds when it gives its audience the resources to act as Sandel hopes they
will. Professional-minded historians might criticize Sandel's historical account
as I have criticized his legal account. Conceivably, they might demonstrate that
Sandel's history is so tendentious that no responsible audience could find in
it anything of value. But Sandel's historical account is not entirely devoid of
value. It offers a narrative accurate enough to resonate with a reasonably well-
informed audience, although perhaps not accurate enough to satisfy a
professional historian. As I suggest regarding the difficulties with Sandel's
legal and philosophical analyses, here too the inaccuracy of Sandel's history
as history is largely irrelevant to his enterprise: The work succeeds if it gains
acceptance among its intended audience. And that, I argue below, it has.
C. Political Philosophy Versus Public Philosophy
Sandel's discussion of John Rawls's recent work has the same
characteristics as his discussions of Supreme Court cases and U.S. history: It
seems inaccurate when taken as a criticism of Rawls's political philosophy but
may well accurately represent a significant public philosophy. Sandel made his
reputation through a book criticizing Rawls's A Theory of Justice'09 for
developing a theory of justice predicated on the purportedly indefensible view
that people have "unencumbered selves" from which they worked in the
famous "original position" to develop liberalism's principles."' Although
Rawls responded that Sandel and like-minded critics misinterpreted A Theory
109. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
110. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
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of Justice, his Political Liberalism'. restated his views with an eye to
showing how his theory did not require that people bracket their
comprehensive moral or political theories to work out an account of political
liberalism.
As I understand Rawls's present position," 2 political liberalism--or as
Sandel calls it "minimalist liberalism"' 3-has three characteristics relevant
here. First, it aims to develop an account of how stable political institutions are
possible in societies characterized by an irreducible pluralism in their
members' comprehensive moral views. Second, stability can be assured by
specifying the characteristics of a handful of basic social institutions; with
those institutions in place, contention over every other aspect of social life will
not destroy stability. Third, we can construct those institutions by determining
what political principles are compatible with all the reasonable comprehensive
views in these pluralist societies." 4 The principles of political liberalism are
in the first instance derived from within each reasonable comprehensive view.
Political liberalism is, or becomes, a freestanding political doctrine when
people use its principles to revise their prior commitments, at least in part
because they understand that some revision may be necessary to ensure social
stability.
I have to say that it seems to me that Sandel simply misunderstands most
of this argument." 5 Minimalist liberals, in Sandel's version, "insist that we
set [our moral or religious] obligations aside when we enter the public realm,
that we bracket our moral and religious convictions when deliberating about
politics and law.""' 6 If they do, Sandel has some cogent criticisms of
minimalist liberals. For example, "[w]hy, in deliberating about justice and
rights, must we set aside the moral judgments that inform the rest of our
lives?"' '
17
If, however, minimalist liberalism generates its principles from within the
plurality of reasonable comprehensive moral views, the criticism must be
different. Sandel discusses slavery and abortion, two issues where, he says,
[a] moral or religious doctrine ... generate[s] interests sufficiently
compelling to burst the brackets ... and morally outweigh the
II1. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
112. Except to note that Sandel's interpretation of A Thieory of Justice was widel) shared. I have no
position on whether Sandel or Rawls better understood that book's premises.
113. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 17.
114. Rawls has been criticized for constructing his principles of political liberalism out of reasonable
comprehensive views only. Sandel, however appears to accept that limitation in refemng to "reasonable
pluralism." Id. at 18. For a brief discussion of the implications of the limitation, see infra note 121.
115. As I read the emerging literature on Political Liberalism. Sandel's misunderstanding is reasonably
widely shared. I am frankly puzzled by this. My best guess is that the misunderstanding occurs because
it provides the basis for positions like Sandel's, which some readers find congenial for reasons I sketch in
Part III.
116. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 18.
117. Id.
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practical interest in social cooperation[.]
... At least where grave moral questions are concerned, whether
it is reasonable to bracket moral and religious controversies for the
sake of political agreement partly depends on which of the contending
moral or religious doctrines is true.
Restricted to grave moral questions, this observation may be correct." 9
Whether it asserts more than the proposition that social cooperation, while
valuable, is not so valuable as always to dominate all other considerations, and
whether Rawls would disagree, are separate questions.
Rawls offers an account of how-or when-stability is possible in a liberal
political system. Showing that stability is sometimes impossible or undesirable
does not impair Rawls's account. To understand how deep Sandel's criticism
of minimalist liberalism goes we need a specification of the criteria for
determining when a moral question is grave. The examples of slavery and
abortion suggest something along these lines: A moral question is grave with
respect to a comprehensive view when those who hold that view could not
revise their view on that question without understanding themselves to have
become different people.120 It may be that when a sufficiently large number
of people hold such views, minimalist liberalism cannot ensure social stability.
After all, slavery was ended in the United States by a large-scale military
conflict. That shows only that the conditions for social stability did not exist
in the United States in 1860-61, not that minimalist liberalism is inadequate
for the contemporary United States.'
2'
Further, Sandel deals with much more than a limited list of questions that
in my view could fairly be described as grave in this sense for a substantial
number of people in the contemporary United States: divorce law, public
assistance programs, the availability of sexually explicit materials, and much
more. The abortion issue may be different from these, and it may be an issue
on which the minimalist liberal construction cannot ensure social stability.
22
118. Id. at 19.
119. It seems to me worth noting, however, that the controversy over slavery was not resolved by
developing a public philosophy that allowed for its peaceable resolution, but by a war.
120. Note that the criteria for identifying issues that are grave with respect to reasonable
comprehensive views must be different from the criteria for identifying fundamentalist comprehensive
views. The latter are unrevisable in principle: Their internal logical structure rules out revision.
121. Again, as I understand it, the qualifier "reasonable" identifies precisely those views, which Rawls
calls "fundamentalist," that are not revisable even in principle. I have suggested elsewhere that Rawlsian
stability is possible in societies some of whose members hold fundamentalist views, as long as there are
not too many of them. See Mark Tushnet, Federalism and Liberalism, 5 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
(forthcoming 1997). To that extent, the Rawlsian scheme need not be understood to be hostile to those who
hold fundamentalist views, and it may account for the fact that the Rawlsian construction cannot deal with
the issue of slavery in the American South and perhaps with the issue of abortion.
122. I regard Rawls's footnote on abortion as a mistake on his part. See RAWLS, supra note Il l, at
243 n.32. There, Rawls asserts that "any reasonable balance" of values he names "due respect for human
life," "ordered reproduction of political society over time," and "the equality of women as equal citizens,"
will lead to a result that will "give a woman a duly qualified right to decide whether or not to end her
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But Sandel's dismissal of minimalist liberalism sweeps more broadly.
Sandel's initial critique of Rawls made a valuable contribution in bringing
to the surface important issues about Rawls's presentation in A Theory of
Justice. My personal view is that it no longer has much bite in light of
Political Liberalism. Even if so, that failure to engage only confirms that there
are real differences between philosophy and public philosophy. According to
Sandel's description of our public philosophy, the American public does not
accept Rawls's account of the conditions for stability in a morally pluralist
society. Even if true, Sandel's argument would not undermine Rawls's
philosophical contributions, which would remain valid so long as his
conclusions follow from his analysis, regardless of whether anyone else drew
them. Sandel offers another criticism of minimalist liberalism that also
establishes the difference. "[E]ven in cases where it is possible to conduct
political debate without reference to our moral and religious convictions,"
Sandel writes, "it may not always be desirable" because the effort "may end
by impoverishing political discourse and eroding the moral and civic resources
necessary to self-government."123 To the extent that cases where doing so is
possible involve the day-to-day stuff of our politics, a minimalist liberal could
readily agree.
Sandel's concern, however, is not with political philosophy but with public
discourse. Even if Rawls neither assumes nor insists that people "'bracket" their
deepest commitments in the ordinary affairs of a liberal polity, Sandel's
description of the procedural republic and its insistence that people are
autonomous, unencumbered choosers nonetheless resonates with something in
the nation's political culture in recent decades. As he writes,
we are beginning to find that a politics that brackets morality and
religion too completely soon generates its own disenchantment. A
procedural republic .... creates a moral void that opens the way for
narrow, intolerant moralisms. And it fails to cultivate the qualities of
character that equip citizens to share in self-rule.'-"
That seems right, and Sandel expresses it with his customary eloquence. Note,
however, that it is politics that Sandel finds inadequate, not political
philosophy.
pregnancy during the first trimester. The reason for this is that at this earl) stage of pregnancy the political
value of the equality of women is overriding." Id. As Rawls recognizes, this assertion is not %%ell defended.
See id. ("I do not discuss the question in general here."). The issue deserves more extended consideration
The fact that Rawls relegated his discussion to a footnote suggests that his treatment need not be taken as
definitive even within his own framework.
123. SANDEL, supra note 3. at 23 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 24.
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III. THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE PROFESSIONAL-MANAGERIAL CLASS
Any work praised, as Democracy's Discontent has been, by Social
Democrat Eric Foner,t 5 Christian Democrat Mary Ann Glendon,'26 and
Tory George Will 127 must be extremely wise, quite confused, or so abstract
that each reader can find in it what she or he wants.128 Democracy's
Discontent has been so well received, I believe, more because it expresses a
mood than because it makes an argument.
29
I suggested earlier that Sandel should be taken as a "culture critic," basing
his interpretation of our culture more on his participation in it than on social-
scientific survey evidence and the like. With some diffidence, I take the same
stance toward Sandel's work, and suggest that it responds to the discontent of
today's professional-managerial class faced with reduced autonomy as
corporate capitalism increasingly limits the domain in which professionals can
125. See Foner, supra note 107, at 34.
126. See Mary Ann Glendon, Civil Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. I, 1996, at 39.
127. Will is quoted on the book's dust-jacket: "This splendid tour of America's political
arguments .... is the thinking person's guide to the current rethinking of the role of government in
America." I use political descriptions drawn from the discourse of Western European politics, which
provide a more nuanced vocabulary than the discourse of American politics in large measure, I believe,
because the United States did not undergo an extended interaction between a socialist movement and the
Roman Catholic Church. See MICHAEL FOGARTY, CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE,
1820-1953 (1957); JAMES HENNESEY, AMERICAN CATHOLICS: A HISTORY OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1981); CUSHING STROUT, THE NEW HEAVENS AND THE NEW EARTH:
POLITICAL RELIGION IN AMERICA (1973); ERNST TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN
CHURCHES (Olive Wyon trans., 1931) (on Europe). (I thank Norman Birnbaum for a decade of gentle
instruction on these questions.) I believe that Foner and Glendon, at least, would acknowledge the accuracy
of the descriptions in broad outlines.
128. As Adam Crawford notes:
The book comes with a very short, four-page preface to the British edition, which identifies a
host of prominent people, from across the political spectrum, who claim to have been inspired
by it. This should immediately alert the wary or cynical reader as to how an agenda can appeal
simultaneously to such diverse interests.
Adam Crawford, Book Review, 23 J.L. & SOC. 247, 247 (1996) (reviewing AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT
OF COMMUNITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993)). In mentioning
Etzioni's work, I do not mean that criticisms of Etzioni can be directly transferred to Sandel. I believe that
I present a fair critique of Sandel's work considered on its own. But that work is also located politically
and socially, and the space it occupies is in the neighborhood of Etzioni's-sufficiently close that, as a
political and social event, we are dealing with a single location. I note as well that an early version of a
portion of Democracy's Discontent appears as a chapter in a work Etzioni edited and offered as an
introduction to communitarian thinking. See Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration:
Abortion and Homosexuality, in NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMUNITIES 71 (Amitai Etzioni ed., 1995) (substantially reproduced in SANDEL, supra note 3, at 91-108).
129. Cf. Kenneth Anderson, Heartless World Revisited: Christopher Lasch 's Parting Polemic Against
the New Class, 6 GOOD SOC'Y, Winter 1996, at 37, 37 (originally appearing in the TIMES LITERARY SUPP.
(London), Sept. 22, 1995, at 3, 4) (describing communitarianism as "an intellectual movement possessing
no organic base except its own sociological analysis and a desire to translate this analysis into feelings, and
then into social practices to reproduce those feelings").
For an argument reconstructing communitarian thought more generally as a political philosophy and
criticizing it from a conservative perspective, see BRUCE FROHNEN, THE NEW COMMUNITARIANS AND TIlE
CRISIS OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1996). The reconstruction is quite interesting, as are those parts of the
critique that do not degenerate into standard Republican rhetoric against the Clinton administration. (The
book's jacket identifies the author as a speechwriter for Republican Senator Spencer Abraham of Michigan.)
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exercise professional judgment and discretion.'" Today's professional-
managerial middle class is discontented with the procedural republic that it
served well, and that served it well, during the period of sustained economic
growth in the United States after 1945. The procedural republic was at least
compatible with the self-conception of professionals and managers as social
engineers, experts who designed the machinery that then operated to produce
economic growth and social stability. As growth slowed, the economic position
of professionals and managers changed. They were no longer experts offering
professional and autonomous advice on how best to steer the economy. They
became employees subject to the market forces they had believed they
controlled. No wonder they are discontented, and thrashing around for a public
philosophy for their class to replace the procedural republic that no longer
satisfies them. Sandel offers an alternative with some elements that respond to
the new position of the professional-managerial class. But his prescriptions do
not in the end satisfactorily address the real source of their discontent: the
apparently uncontrollable power of transnational corporations.
Sandel's proposed public philosophy evokes the Progressive era even as
it departs from some of its prescriptions.' 3' The Progressive movement,
historians have argued, was basically a movement of middle-class professionals
who sought to define public policy by combining an emphasis on efficiency
with efforts to achieve moral uplift. 32 Efficiency was to be achieved by
following the prescriptions of experts drawn from the movement's base of
independent professionals. Moral progress was defined with reference to the
standards of the professional class, and would be achieved sometimes by
coercion and sometimes by creating institutions that would induce their
participants to act morally.
Sandel's vision is striking because it restates the Progressive emphasis on
moral uplift while eliminating the Progressive interest in efficiency and
expertise. 33 By dropping deference to expert judgment Sandel shows himself
130. For a recent work by a sociologist describing and accounting for shifts in the poer of
professionals in similar terms, see ELuIOrr A. KRAUSE. DEAni oF riIE GUILDS. PROFESSIONS. STATES.
AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO ThiE PRESENT (1996). Se" id. at 22 C"[G]uild povcr is
declining as state power and capitalist power encroach upon it."); id. at 280 ("[Flormerly slf-run
professional groups have slowly been losing the ability to control their own associations, to control the
workplace, to control the market for their services, and to control their relation to the state.") (emphasis
added).
131. The chapter in which Sandel discusses the Progressis e era opens s ith a more extended cs ocation
of today's discontents than the other chapters in Part 11, and contains phrases like "*Itlhcn as nos -SA.NDEL
supra note 3, at 205.
132. See generally ROBERT WIEBE, TilE SEARCIH FOR ORDER. 1877-1920 (1967). Daniel Rodgcrs. The
Search for Progressivism, 10 REvs. AM. HIST. 113 (1982).
133. Some analysts suggest that contemporary communitananism reproduces the Progressisc emphasis
on expertise. See, e.g., Derber, supra note 2, at 27 (finding communitanans "predisposed toward consensual
management by experts"); Kenneth Anderson. Review Essay. A New Class of Law) ers The Therapeuttic
as Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1062, 1089 (1996) ("[The unhappiness of lawyers looks rather less
like professionals experiencing the loss of fulfillment . . . and rather more like the unhappiness of expens
who, having established to their own satisfaction the certainty of ends not open for argument by non-
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to be a more committed democrat than were the Progressives.' 3 His stance
may also reflect the understanding of contemporary professionals that the
bureaucracies within which they work do not actually value their expertise as
professionals.
Subordinating efficiency is more problematic. Sandel describes the
contemporary "anti-sprawl" movement as a revisitation of the anti-chain store
movement. 135 As Thomas McCraw has argued in detail, the Brandeisian
program was not an obviously sensible one.136 It sacrificed real economic
benefits-lower prices for goods-in exchange for speculative benefits in the
form of greater civic participation by people of the type caricatured in Sinclair
Lewis's novels. 37 Sandel's contemporary example is an activist opposing the
location of a Wal-Mart, who declared, "'I'd rather have a viable community
than a cheap pair of underwear.
' 131
I do not know anything about that particular activist, but that is the sort
of thing that can be said, or at least admired, only by people who do not have
to worry that higher priced underwear means sending their children to school
in worn-out underwear or having less food on the table for dinner. So, one
characteristic of the class to which Sandel's vision appeals is reasonable
material security: Its members are less concerned with efficiency than were the
Progressives because the marginal gains from more efficient operation would
not significantly affect the material dimensions of their lives.
The procedural republic triumphed when "the performance of the domestic
economy gave Americans a sense of command over their individual
experts, wonder why they are not also loved."). These criticisms, except for the more modest claim that
there are substantive arguments for political positions, properly apply to communitarians who arc less
committed democrats than Sandel. Sandel does not claim much for experts on these matters because he
does not specify what the winning substantive arguments might be, although his discussion of gay rights
does hint at the answers he would give.
134. Sandel's disparagement of popular culture, however, in his concluding reference to "the vacant,
vicarious fare of confessional talk shows," SANDEL, supra note 3, at 351, is dismaying, albeit typical of
intellectuals speaking for and to the professional-managerial class. For a discussion of the popular culture
issue, see J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935
(1995) (book review).
135. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 334-35.
136. See THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Louis D.
BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 101-09, 135-41 (1984). McCraw summarizes his analysis
of Brandeis's position:
Brandeis' fixation on bigness as the essence of the problem doomed to superficiality both his
diagnosis and his prescription .... It meant that he must argue against vertical integration and
other innovations that enhanced productive efficiency and consumer welfare .... It meant that
he must promote retail price fixing as a means of protecting individual wholesalers and retailers,
even though consumers again suffered. It meant, finally, that he must become in significant
measure not the "people's lawyer" but the spokesman of retail druggists, small shoe
manufacturers, and other members of the petite bourgeoisie.
Id. at 141.
137. See, e.g., SINCLAIR LEWIS, BABBITT (1922).
138. Andrew Friedman, Citizens Fight Wal-Mart Sprawl, NEIGHBORHOOD WORKS, Oct.-Nov. 1994,
at 10, cited in SANDEL, supra note 3, at 335.
1592
Sandel's Public Philosophy
destinies."' 139 Prosperity made credible the "consumerist vision" of a people
united only in "the experience of consumption.' Contemporary
professionals have lost the sense of control and mastery. "America's moment
of mastery expired" in 1968,' 4' after which "[alt home and abroad, events
spun out of control, and government seemed helpless to respond." 42 Despite
this, middle-class professionals have not experienced substantial reductions in
material well-being. Unsurprisingly, they might be interested in recapturing
some control at the expense of some slight reduction in their material well-
being, even if the effects on the material well-being of less privileged groups
might be more substantial.
Why might such a class fail to develop a vision in which expertise plays
the role it did in the Progressive vision? Perhaps because today's professional
class is not truly independent.4 3 Engineers and doctors are increasingly
employees rather than independent contractors. Perhaps too it is this lack of
independence that makes Sandel's interest in developing a political economy
of citizenship appealing. Until today's professionals become independent they
know that they cannot impose policies in the name of their expertise; they
would instead simply be acting on behalf of their employers. Like many
jeremiads, Sandel's evokes images of a romanticized past that we have lost but
might recreate." He tells today's professionals that they once were
independent and ought to be so again.
What is left is moral uplift. Sandel criticizes modern no-fault divorce law
because it "bracket[s] the moral considerations that had traditionally governed
the law of divorce."'' 45 Given the prevalence of divorce among today's
professionals, however, he does not urge a return to a fault-based divorce
regime. Instead, he seeks only "reforms giving greater attention to the
economic conditions of women and children after divorce," reforms that he
acknowledges might in some cases "be defended in terms consistent with
procedural liberalism."' t46 He is a bit more aggressive about using systems
139. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 275.
140. Id. at 221.
141. Id. at 294-95.
142. Id. at 294.
143. In the late 1970s and early 1980s. sociologists influenced by Marxist theory engaged in an
extended discussion of the characteristics of the professional-managenal class. See. e.g. BETSE. ,, LABOR
AND CAPITAL (Pat Walker ed., 1979); ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, CLASSES (1985). For a recent application. see
Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats. 74 TEX. L REV 1847 (1996)
144. See Foner, supra note 107, at 34 (referring to Sandel's "'tendency to romanticize the past as a
golden age of community responsibility").
145. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 109.
146. Id. at 11. Sandel relies in part on research reported by Lenore Weitzman. finding that "ior
men, divorce brings a 42 percent increase in standard of living- while divorced %% omen and their children
suffer a 73 percent decline." Id. (citing LENORE J. WEflZ'.tAN. TIlE DIVORCE REVOLLrION 186. 265.
338-39, 362 (1985)). Professor Weitzman now agrees that these figures are inaccurate; her data actually
showed a 10% increase for divorced men, and a 27% decline for divorced %%omen. See Richard R Peterson.
A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce, 61 A..I. Soc. REV 528, 528 (1996). Lenore
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of public assistance to "form moral character or shape behavior or cultivate
virtue," criticizing proposals made during the 1960s and 1970s for a
guaranteed income on the ground that they would merely "enable recipients to
choose their values and ends for themselves."'47
Sandel nonetheless emphasizes "the civic case against inequality,"'' 48
because economic inequality "erodes civic virtue"'149 as the affluent secede
from the public sphere. Sandel endorses a description of that secession
appearing in a celebrated book by President Clinton's former Secretary of
Labor Robert Reich. 150 Reich describes the proliferation of "'private health
clubs, golf clubs, tennis clubs, skating clubs,"""' private schools, private
garbage collection services, and private security guards.152 This secession is
real, but Sandel and Reich perhaps overestimate it. I suspect that it describes
more what middle-class professionals fear that they need but will be unable to
afford than the lived experiences of the bulk of that class.
Sandel discusses public policies committed to formative projects "aimed
at cultivating citizens of a certain kind."'' 53 He occasionally hints at what
seems obvious, that each formative project was connected to a particular social
class. 54  Some of his historical actors are Jeffersonian agrarians,1
55
Jacksonian artisans seeking secure property holdings, 56 wage laborers hoping
"to rise to own productive property and to work for [themselves],"' 57 and
workers seeking an eight-hour day in part to give them time to participate in
civic affairs. 158 When we reach the procedural republic, however, the
material basis disappears from view. Sandel offers no direct account of the
material basis for the procedural republic, nor of the material basis for the
rather vague formative project he urges as an alternative public philosophy. 59
J. Weitzman, The Economic Consequences of Divorce Are Still Unequal: Comment on Peterson, 61 AM.
Soc. REv. 537, 538 (1996).
147. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 289.
148. Id. at 330.
149. Id. at 332.
150. See id. at 330-32 (citing ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATION, 268-77 (1991)).
151. See id. at 331 (quoting REICH, supra note 150, at 268).
152. See id. (citing REICH, supra note 150, at 269-70).
153. Id. at 127.
154. Nor does he describe the class basis of the procedural republic, although corporate capitalism
seems to be the natural candidate.
155. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 142-50.
156. See id. at 155-60.
157. Id. at 181.
158. See id. at 189-92.
159. Cf. Anderson, supra note 133, at 1087. According to Anderson:
Populism is-or was-rooted in a form of material production associated with the petty
bourgeoisie.... [1]t really is a sensibility rooted in a social class, produced and reproduced by
a material mode of production that no longer exists .... [T]his class had been dispossessed of
the material basis of its traditions by changes in capitalism itself.
Id. (describing argument of CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE REVOLT OF THE ELITES AND THE BETRAYAL OF
DEMOCRACY (1995)).
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Sandel points out that the "sense of disempowerment" he attributes to
Americans "arises from the fact that the liberal self-image and the actual
organization of modem social and economic life are sharply at odds."
't 60
"Self-government ... requires political communities that control their
destinies," but "[in a world of global interdependence, even the most powerful
nation-states are no longer the masters of their destiny."' 6t Thus, "[iJf
American politics is to revitalize the civic strand of freedom, it must find a
way to ask what economic arrangements are hospitable to self-
government."
162
When Sandel sketches his way out, however, the suggestions seem ill-
suited to the task. He admires community development corporations, the "New
Urbanism," and community organizing. 163 He acknowledges, though, that
-[i]n a world where capital and goods ... flow across national boundaries with
unprecedented ease, politics must assume transnational, even global forms, if
only to keep up. Otherwise, economic power will go unchecked by
democratically sanctioned political power."'' But how can we "cultivate the
civic identities necessary to sustain those institutions, to supply them with the
moral authority they require"?
65
The problem is one Progressives confronted early in the twentieth
century.' 66 Sandel describes two dimensions of the Progressive project. The
more familiar involves the expansion of national political power to control the
expanded power of corporations.'6 7 Less familiar is the Brandeisian vision.
As an example, Sandel describes anti-chain store legislation following World
War I as an expression of a public philosophy seeking to preserve small
businesses whose owners made important contributions to their communities'
public life-at added expense to consumers, of course.'" The chain stores
won:
While local grocers and druggists had presented themselves, not
wholly convincingly, as the yeomen of their day, the last bearers of
republican virtue, the chains stood instead for good products at low
160. SANDEL, supra note 3. at 202.
161. Id. For an argument that capital mobilty has a smaller causal impact on disintegraton of
communities and neighborhoods than expansion of government. see Dav id Conway. Capitahlim and
Community, 13 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 137, 152-53, 159 (1996). 1 find the argument unpersuasie on its own
terms, but in any event, it does not establish that making government smaller would o crcome whatevcr
effects capital mobility does have.
162. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 203.
163. See id. at 333-37.
164. Id. at 338-39.
165. Id. at 338.
166. See id. at 339-41.
167. See id. at 216-17.
168. See id. at 227-31.
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prices. In the face of these alternatives, the political economy of
citizenship was losing its capacity to inspire.
69
Similar alternatives present themselves today. We might seek to expand the
capacity of supranational institutions to control supranational corporations,
while simultaneously remedying the democratic deficit that notoriously afflicts
such institutions today.170 But, Sandel suggests, creating transnational
institutions that "can inspire the identification and allegiance-the moral and
civic culture-on which democratic authority ultimately depends" may be
impossible.' 7 ' Historical experience is discouraging, for "even nation-states
find it difficult to inspire the sense of community and civic engagement self-
government requires. Political associations more expansive than nations, and
with fewer cultural traditions and historical memories to draw upon, may find
the task of cultivating commonality more difficult still.'
72
Sandel notes that some "commentators of the 1990s saw in international
environmental, human rights, and women's movements the emergence of a
'global civil society' that might serve as a counterweight to the power of
global markets and media,"' 173 but he finds the cosmopolitan ideal that
animates this suggestion "flawed, both as a moral ideal and as a public
philosophy for self-government in our time."'' 74 As Sandel sees it, advocates
of the global civic society urge that "universal identities must always take
precedence over particular ones"; 75 but this position implausibly requires
that we subordinate our friends and neighbors to humanity in general. On the
political level, even national sovereignty is "challenged ... by the resurgent
aspirations of subnational groups for autonomy and self-rule."' 176 Thus,
"[g]iven the limits of cosmopolitan politics, the attempt to save democracy by
globalizing citizenship ... is unlikely to succeed."'
177
The alternative, reminiscent of Sandel's interest in federalism and the anti-
chain store movement, is to "disperse" sovereignty by ensuring that there is "a
multiplicity of communities and political bodies-some more, some less
extensive than nations-among which sovereignty is diffused.' 78 In some
settings, "dispersing sovereignty may entail according greater cultural and
political autonomy to subnational communities-such as Catalans and Kurds,
169. Id. at 23 1.
170. For a discussion of the democratic deficit in the institutions of the European Community, see
Shirley Williams, Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, in THE NEW EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY: DECiSIONMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 155, 158-59 (Robert O. Keohane & Stanley
Hoffmann eds., 1991).
171. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 339.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 341.
174. Id. at 342.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 344.
177. Id. at 345.
178. Id.
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Scots and Qufbecois-even while strengthening and democratizing
transnational structures, such as the European Union." '79
Again, this is a rich but puzzling account of the possibilities for a better
public philosophy. It suggests a path by which the now inadequate procedural
republic might come to embody a public philosophy that would better serve the
interests of the professional managerial class.' s° Dispersing sovereignty may
create communities whose local commitments allow them to resist economic
transformations that global capitalism describes as mere interregional capital
flows. With such a base, the professional-managerial class might turn its
attention to the real source of its discontent, the transnational corporation. But
how can that resistance succeed?
Begin with the vision of a "global civil society." 'iS As Sandel notes, its
advocates have welcomed the development of transnational social
movements-the so-called New Social Movements-encompassing the
environmental movements typified by Greens in many countries; women's
movements exemplified by the nongovernmental organizations associated with
the United Nations conferences on women; and the international human rights
movement. Except for the last, it does not seem to me that these movements
demand that "universal identities ... always take precedence over particular
ones."1 12 True, the human rights movement seeks minimal human decencies,
universal in their application but rather restricted in their scope. It allows a
substantial range of particular practices within a framework of minimal human
rights. 183 The transnational women's movement rather evidently asks at most
that one particular identity-womanhood-take precedence over another-
nationality. Even Greens can be understood to be asking that our identities as
consumers be subordinated to our identities as citizens or, more narrowly, as
citizens of particular nations, states, or even neighborhoods.'S4
Further, Sandel acknowledges that some aspects of the cosmopolitan ideal
are "attractive."'8 5 I am puzzled by his insistence that cosmopolitanism is an
all-or-nothing identity. Why cannot our political identities, and therefore our
179. Id.
180. The class's public philosophy has to get from here to there. shich means that se should not be
surprised to find false starts or residues of the inadequate prior public philosophy, as in d1%s ion v. ithin the
class over support for the North American Free Trade Agreement.
181. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 341. As my colleague Mitt Rcgan put it in his comments on a draft of
this Review, Sandel "advises us to 'Act Locally.' but doesn't tell us how to 'Think Globally "
182. Id. at 342. For a discussion of political and legal strategies to address problems created by
transnational employment of workers under conditions often regarded as belos minimal standards. see
Laura Ho et al., (Dis)Assembling Rights of Women ltbrkers Along the Global Assemblh Line Human Rights
and the Garment Industry, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 383. 394-413 (1996)
183. For an argument that the international human nghts mosemeni insolhes appeals io nghts that are
minimal in one sense but maximal in another, see MiCHAEL WALZER. ThiCK AD Tini', MORAL
ARGUMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD 6-11 (1994).
184. Consider in this connection the widespread. and not entirely admirable. "'Not In My Back Yard"
(NIMBY) phenomenon associated with environmental politics.
185. SANDEL, supra note 3. at 342.
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public philosophy, be fluid, sometimes expressing the valuable aspects of
cosmopolitanism and sometimes expressing our more particular commitments
to family, friends, neighbors, nations, ethnic groups, and religious confreres?
I admit that these different identities might sometimes conflict, but I do not see
why a public philosophy that acknowledges the possibility of internal conflicts,
and treats such conflicts as an occasion for political deliberation and struggle,
could not inspire the allegiance that Sandel requires. In particular, Sandel's
own account suggests that some economic dimension of identity-as farmer,
as artisan, as professional-may be essential to the construction of an overall
public philosophy adequate to deal with the global economy. It seems clear
that the identity "consumer" will not do, but it is not clear to me that no
alternative identity is possible. Indeed, economic identities in a world of
transnational economic arrangements may themselves transcend national
boundaries: Farmers in the European Union may have more in common with
farmers in the United States than they do with professionals in Germany, for
example.8 6
On the penultimate page of Democracy's Discontent, Sandel writes that,
"[t]he civic virtue distinctive to our time is the capacity to negotiate our way
among the sometimes overlapping, sometimes conflicting obligations that claim
us, and to live with the tension to which multiple loyalties give rise."'' The
New Social Movements in their transnational forms may satisfy Sandel's
description. He can dismiss cosmopolitanism only because he treats it as
insisting on the primacy of a universal personhood in all circumstances.
A complex cosmopolitanism, it seems to me, is necessary to eliminate
what otherwise seems to be a dramatic mismatch between Sandel's desire to
diffuse sovereignty and his acknowledgment of transnational economic
power.18S Simply put, we need an explanation of how diffusing sovereignty
downward, for example, to the Kurds and Qu6becois, will generate allegiance
to transnational institutions, such as the European Union and its equivalents,
with enough power to control transnational economic actors. Sandel writes, "In
the age of NAFTA, the politics of neighborhood matters more, not less. People
will not pledge allegiance to vast and distant entities ... unless those
institutions are somehow connected to political arrangements that reflect the
identity of the participants."' 89 It remains unclear to me, however, how
people are "connected to" transnational institutions except through aspects of
the cosmopolitanism that Sandel thinks inadequate. Perhaps the experience of
186. It used to be that "member of the international proletariat" was thought to be such an identity,
but it is no longer (or at least not widely) thought to be so.
187. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 350.
188. See John B. Judis, Public Freedoms, Personal Liberties, WASH. POST BOOK WORLD, May 5,
1996, at 6 (expressing disappointment with Sandel's "saccharine conclusion" and arguing that "[a]s
economic power has become increasingly concentrated in transnational corporations, only collective efforts
that can match the power of these behemoths will restore the basis of popular liberty").
189. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 346.
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politics in a neighborhood will help shape political character in a way that will
make people better participants in the politics of supranational institutions that
have become both more democratic and more powerful. But to exercise
effective control over transnational corporate power, I would think, people
must participate in such institutions as democrats, not as Kurds or
Qu6becois-and to that extent, as cosmopolitans.
No one should be surprised that Democracy 's Discontent has been as well-
received as it has been. After all, book reviews in elite newspapers and
journals of opinion are written by and for members of the professional-
managerial class to which Sandel's analysis would naturally appeal. As a
member of that class, I am hardly in a position to say that the anxieties Sandel
describes have no foundation whatsoever. If any institutions will ever be able
to take control of supranational corporate power, they will need to have the
support of the professional-managerial class. Sandel's vision of "multiply-
encumbered citizens" may allow members of that class to become political
allies of the New Social Movements or other more cosmopolitan efforts. His
interest in federalism provides an opportunity to examine how that might
occur.
IV. SANDEL ON FEDERALISM
For the most part, Democracy's Discontent is a diagnosis, not a
prescription.' 90 The most interesting suggestion Sandel proffers is that our
public philosophy ought to "consider the unrealized possibilities implicit in
American federalism."' 9' According to Sandel, "proliferating sites of civic
190. Sometimes Sandel offers policy prescriptions that he asserts flow from his diagnosis, as %shcn
he suggests, without saying so directly, that we ought to have greater regulation of hate speech and sexually
explicit material than current law allows. See id. at 83-90. Current law. Sandel writes. rests on the premises
of the procedural republic which "bracket disapproval of speech." Id. at 89. Instead. Sandcl asserts, judges
should "reluctant[ly ... make substantive moral distinctions" between speech that promotes genocide and
hate, and speech seeking civil rights. Id. at 90. His example is an opinion by District Judge Frank Johnson
permitting a civil rights march along a public highway that. in Johnson's view. "reached 'to the outer limits
of what is constitutionally allowed,"' because, as Johnson saw it. "-the extent of the nght to.
demonstrate ... should be commensurate with the enormity of the wrongs that are being protested.'- Id.
(quoting Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100, 108, 106 (M.D. Ala. 1965)). This decision. Sandel vntes.
"was not content neutral" and "would not have helped the Nazis in Skokie." Id. At least as quoted.
Johnson's opinion, although content-based, is not necessarily inconsistent with allowing the Nazis to march
in Skokie. Reaching the outer limits is not extending beyond them, which implies that the content-based
elements in Johnson's analysis may not have been necessary. The march. described by Sandel as "a mass
march along a public highway," appears to have been more disruptive of traffic than the Nazis' march
would have been, which implies that the case against the civil rights march on ordinary public safety
grounds (rather than "hostile audience" or "intentional infliction of emotional distress" grounds) was
stronger than the case against the Nazi march on similar grounds. See td.
191. Id. at 347. Andrew Sullivan's review of Democracy's Discontent notes that Sandel "tiptoels) up
to notions that might truly startle, only to pull back at the brink." Andrew Sullivan. Alternative Politics.
N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1996, § 7 (Book Review), at 6. That is a fair description of Sandel's treatment of
federalism. In what follows I believe that I have fairly teased out the implications and some possible
defenses of Sandel's treatment, but his discussion is, in general, fragmented and fragmentary. Mary Ann
Glendon praises Sandel for dealing with federalism, but regrets his failure to discuss "the nitty-gntty of
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activity and political power can serve self-government by cultivating virtue,
equipping citizens for self-rule, and generating loyalties to larger political
wholes."
92
Well, yes, it can do that, in the sense that federalism makes those
possibilities available. 193 The attractions of federalism are a submerged theme
throughout Democracy's Discontent,t94 but its downside is never mentioned.
More generally, Sandel gives little content to his idea of federalism, allowing
readers to fill it in with whatever they think attractive about federalism while
leaving out whatever they find unattractive.
When federalism is understood, as it should be, as an institutional form
that protects genuine value pluralism, we can also understand the full scope of
Sandel's proposal and its associated difficulties. We can also see how
something like federalism allows us to develop the idea of a complex
cosmopolitanism that seems necessary if we are to have a public philosophy
adequate to the economic questions of the day.195 A federalist theory rooted
in complex cosmopolitanism would offer the possibility of understanding how
conflicts among the different commitments implicit in complex
cosmopolitanism might be negotiated.
96
A. Defending Federalism as a Form of Complex Cosmopolitanism
You have to admire anyone who, like Sandel, has a bad word to say about
one of the icons of contemporary constitutional law. West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette's 19 7 invalidation of a state-imposed requirement that
all students, even those with religious objections, salute the flag is typically
celebrated for its ringing statement that, "[i]f there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."' 8 Sandel, in contrast, sees in Barnette the arrival of the procedural
republic. 99 The state could not "cultivate a common citizenship," which
could occur only through "a voluntary act by free and independent selves."2
federalism." Glendon, supra note 126, at 40-41.
192. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 348.
193. A range of other institutional designs do the same.
194. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 3, at 28, 36-37, 77, 89, 116.
195. Even sketching the kinds of political projects that such a public philosophy might generate is
beyond my ability. To the extent that such projects emerge out of real engagement with concrete problems
of controlling transnational corporate power, it is not clear to me that this sort of Review is the right place
to attempt such a sketch.
196. Negotiated, not resolved: The complexity of complex cosmopolitanism means that there never
will be an algorithm for resolving conflicts.
197. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
198. Id. at 642. For a recent celebration of the opinion, see Charles Alan Wright, My Favorite
Opinion-The Second Flag-Salute Case, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1297 (1996).
199. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 54.
200. Id.
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Sandel's brief comments on Barnette open wide vistas on "the unrealized
possibilities implicit in American federalism.' In one dimension the issues
are purely conceptual. Sandel wants our public philosophy to acknowledge, as
federalism can, that we are embedded rather than "free and independent
selves. 20 2 But in what community or communities are we embedded? And
when the selves these communities attempt to shape conflict, how is our public
philosophy to resolve such conflicts?
Barnette raises these questions in two quite dramatic ways. The school
children who refused to salute the flag did so because they felt the pull of
another, higher authority: their religion. Less obviously, it seems to me that
Sandel might have noted the apparent anomaly that a local school board and
state legislature were insisting that children affirm their allegiance to the
nation. This is an odd federalism and an equally odd ground on which to
defend our embeddedness in communities.
Elsewhere, Sandel notes a similar oddity. Discussing and criticizing
President Johnson's "politics of unity," Sandel refers to Johnson's description
of a meeting at the White House during the Cuban missile crisis: "'You
couldn't tell from anyone's comment what their religion was or what their
party was, and you could not even observe from their accent where they were
from.' 23 For Sandel, this shows that to Johnson, "[the ideal American
citizen would think and act as a kind of universal person, unencumbered by
particular identities and attachments." 24 Again, there is much to ponder in
this brief passage. One might wonder, for example, whether Cubans and
Russians-or at least Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev-would have
described the "high government and military officials at the White House"2-
as acting as "universal persons." One might wonder as well what exactly was
wrong in so acting, given the nature of the Soviet and Cuban regimes. -'
Finally, one might think that Sandel provides a ground here for defending
Barnette's result: West Virginia's legislature was promoting exactly the sort
of nationalism that Sandel finds defective in Johnson's vision of American
citizenship.
Perhaps Sandel objects only to Barnette's rhetoric, not its result. Perhaps
in his view the opinion should have made a contribution to a public philosophy
that reconciled the competing demands of identities as religious citizens, as
state citizens, and as United States citizens. Sandel's analysis, however, so
201. Id. at 347.
202. Id. at 54.
203. Id. at 283 (citation omitted).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 1 have no strong views on whether the U.S. actions dunng the Cuban missilc cnss ',erc justified.
but I would think it reasonably uncontroversial that one of the things to be considered in am Ing at somc
bottom-line assessment ought to be what course of action was more likely to promote "univ'er-al human
rights.
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strongly counterposes "universal" personhood with an undifferentiated
embeddedness that he does not give readers the resources to figure out what
that public philosophy would be.
Perhaps focusing on rhetoric rather than results gives up the defense of
federalism too easily. Here it helps to return to Barnette's background. Three
years earlier, the Supreme Court had upheld a state's compulsory flag-salute
statute as, in Sandel's words, "a legitimate way of cultivating the communal
identity of its citizens."''  The results on the ground were not attractive.
Eight days after the decision, a Jehovah's Witnesses' hall in Maine was
burned; elsewhere mobs attacked Witnesses and, in one case, castrated a
Witness. 208 How can this be turned into a story supporting federalism?
The answer, I believe, is that one might locate resources within each state
or community to counter the underside of federalism. Michael Walzer
describes this as the best and perhaps the only form of effective social
criticism.29 The social critic, for Walzer, gives "expression to his [sic]
people's deepest sense of how they ought to live. 2' 0 For example, a state
judge in West Virginia published a pamphlet explaining why he acquitted
parents of charges they violated the state's truancy laws when their children
were expelled for refusing to salute the flag; another state judge held that West
Virginia's compulsory flag-salute statute violated the state constitution; some
teachers and principals also resisted efforts to force children to salute the flag;
a federal jury--composed of West Virginians-convicted two state officials for
helping a mob attack Jehovah's Witnesses.2"'
One might suggest, then, that outside intervention against repressive forces
within a community might not have been absolutely necessary. Some
opponents of those forces might invoke local identities and local commitments
as grounds for their opposition. One must concede that in circumstances like
Barnette, where national elites were willing to intervene to override local
decisions, it was easier to seek such intervention than to take the path of
entirely local resistance, which was more costly both financially and, as the
violence indicates, in human terms. But, a defender of federalism might
suggest, in the long run preserving local identities contributes more to human
207. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 53 (discussing Minersville Sch, Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
208. See DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY 164-65
(1962). Manwaring emphasizes that violence did not begin only after Gobitis but says that "the outburst
that followed [Gobiris] was impressive." Id. at 164. According to one calculation, nearly 1500 Witnesses
were victimized after Gobitis. See LEONARD A. STEVENS, SALUTE!: THE CASE OF THE BIBLE VS. THE FLAG
113 (1973) (describing without precise citation Department of Justice "tabulation"); cf. MANWARING, supra,
at 167-68 (describing difficulties in arriving at precise figure).
209. See MICHAEL WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 33-66 (1987).
210. MICHAEL WALZER, THE COMPANY OF CRITICS: SOCIAL CRITICISM AND POLITICAL COMMITMENT
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 232 (1988).
211. The events are described in Robert J. O'Brien, Persecution and Resistance: Jehovah's Witnesses
and the Defense of Religious Liberty in West Virginia 7-8, 11-12, 20-21 (June 20, 1996) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
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well-being than the procedural republic does. By confining the location of the
debate to West Virginia, federalism's defender might say, we would enhance
the possibility of civic deliberation and engagement.
The difficulty with this line of argument, however, is that while there may
have been local people willing to resist, the grounds for their resistance were
not truly local, despite the invocation of the West Virginia Constitution in one
case. The provision the state judge invoked was West Virginia's religious
liberty guarantee: "No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship, place or ministry whatsoever; nor shall any man be
enforced, restrained, molested or burthened, in his body or goods, or otherwise
suffer, on account of his religious opinions or belief .... ,2'. This is a
classic statement of universal principle, different in some details from the
parallel provision in the national Constitution but no less universal in its
premises. The physical location of the debate, that is, would have been West
Virginia, but its conceptual location would have been the world. This example
suggests what a complex cosmopolitanism might look like.213
Although Sandel does not develop this defense of federalism in connection
with Barnette, he does pursue a related line in his discussion of the civil rights
movement. He acknowledges that the civil rights movement was, in part, a
liberal movement "about respecting persons as persons, regardless of their race,
religion, or other particular characteristics. '2 4 But, Sandel writes, -this is not
the whole story.",21i More important, the civil rights movement was "a
moment of empowerment" in which people "act[ed] collectively to shape the
public world. 21 6 And the movement took shape in the "'public spaces...
provided by the black churches of the South."' ' 7 For Sandel, then, the civil
rights movement must be understood in light of the specifically Christian
identities of its leading participants. It is no accident, as the classic phrase has
it, that Martin Luther King, Jr., headed the Southern Christian Leadership
Conference.
Sandel's account, however, appears to omit some important dimensions of
the civil rights movement, particularly with reference to the federalism whose
"unrealized possibilities" Sandel hopes to engender. In substantial part, the
movement appealed to the national government's power to displace local
practices, and it invoked the Equal Protection Clause understood in universalist
terms to justify that appeal. Even the movement's Christian roots had a
212. NV. VA. CONST. art. Il, § 15.
213. In my view it is also consistent with \Valzer's description of the social cnuc. although I am not
sure that Walzer would agree. For a recent statement, see Michael Walzer. Spheres of Affecton. in MARTHA
C. NUSSBAUM Er AL., FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 125 (Joshua Cohen
ed., 1996).
214. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 348.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 349.
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universalist element in the Christian view that all people are brothers and
sisters in Christ.
21 8
King's Letter from Birmingham City Jail, for example, is shot through
with Christian references, in part because the letter responded to an Appeal for
Law and Order and Common Sense published by eight white ministers.
219
The letter has the rhythm of the African-American pulpit, but King's argument
for disobedience of unjust laws was not specifically Christian. The letter is a
classic document of American constitutionalism because it seamlessly weaves
together religious and constitutional appeals.
Responding to charges that the civil rights movement was "extremist,"
King "gained a bit of satisfaction from being considered an extremist," and
listed those he considered his predecessors: Jesus, Amos, Paul, Martin Luther,
and John Bunyan to be sure, but also Abraham Lincoln and Thomas
Jefferson.2 ° Segregation laws were unjust because "segregation distorts the
soul and damages the personality. '22 1 The letter defined unjust laws in
religious and universal terms:
A just law is a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the
law of God .... Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any
law that degrades human personality is unjust....
... An unjust law is a code that a majority inflicts on a minority
that is not binding on itself. This is difference made legal....
... An unjust law is a code inflicted upon a minority which that
minority had no part in enacting or creating because they did not have
the unhampered right to vote.
King's litany of segregation's injuries appeals to a universal sense of
outrage.
223
218. Mitt Regan has suggested to me that Christian commitments are "still local and particular in the
sense that they are rooted in a psychological and emotional experience that includes awareness of their
distinctiveness from the beliefs or commitments of others," and that "coming to understand the force of
universal principles would seem a far more profound process when one begins with these commitments and
begins to discern their universalistic dimension, than when one absorbs universal principles as part of a
more abstract doctrine or the unity of humanity." Letter from Mitt Regan to Mark Tushnet 5 (Aug. 28,
1996) (on file with author). I agree with the first observation, but find the psychological claim in the second
unconvincing as a general proposition, however true it might be in specific cases.
219. See Martin L. King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham City Jail, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 72 (Hugo
Adam Bedau ed., 1969).
220. See id. at 82-83.
221. Id. at77.
222. Id. at 77-78.
223. King's appeal depended upon universal outrage to particular experiences:
[W]hen you have seen vicious mobs lynch your mothers and fathers at will and drown your
sisters and brothers at whim; when you have seen hate-filled policemen curse, kick, brutalize
and even kill your black brothers and sisters with impunity; when you see the vast majority of
your twenty million Negro brothers smothering in an air-tight cage of poverty in the midst of
an affluent society; when you suddenly find your tongue twisted and your speech stammering
as you seek to explain to your six-year-old daughter why she can't go to the public amusement
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The letter's powerful conclusion invokes religious and American traditions
as if they were different but linked:
One day the South will know that when these disinherited children of
God sat down at lunch counters they were in reality standing up for
the best in the American dream and the most sacred values in our
Judeo-Christian heritage, and thusly, carrying our whole nation back
to those great wells of democracy which were dug deep by the
founding fathers in the formulation of the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence. 24
Again, however, one might reconstruct federalism by suggesting that
resources to transform Southern race relations were available within the
Southern white community. Justice Felix Frankfurter hoped even in the midst
of the Little Rock school crisis that Southerners of good will-he rarely added
the word "white"-could "further the acceptance in action" of "the inevitability
of desegregation."'2 Robert Burt's more recent argument that Supreme Court
decisions ought to ensure that neither side gain absolute victory can be
understood in similar terms by those who, like Burt, desire the effective
transformation of race relations. '2 6
I doubt, however, that even relying on resources within the South invokes
federalism in any significant sense. It treats federalism as an effective
instrument of social transformation to achieve the universal goals of the civil
rights movement, not as a vindication of fundamental value pluralism, which
are its "unrealized possibilities." The movement's roots in a specifically
Christian setting are not irrelevant, but precisely because the Christian
commitments were simultaneously universal ones, they look a great deal like
elements of the Rawlsian overlapping consensus against which Sandel argues
park that has just been advertised on television, and see tears sclling up in her little eyes Nhen
she is told that Funtown is closed to colored children, and see the depressing clouds of
inferiority begin to form in her little mental sky. and see her begin to distort her little
personality by unconsciously developing a bitterness toward sshitc people; %%hen )ou ha'e to
concoct an answer for a five-year-old son asking in agonizing pathos: "Daddy. %%hy do %hitc
people treat colored people so mean?"; when you take a cross country dnsc and find it
necessary to sleep night after night in the uncomfortable comers of your automobile because
no motel will accept you; when you are humiliated day in and day out by nagging signs reading
"white" and "colored"; when your first name becomes "nigger" and your middle name becomes
"boy" (however old you are) and your last name becomes "John." and %hen your kife and
mother are never given the respected title "Mrs.": when you are hamed by day and haunted at
night by the fact that you are a Negro, living constantly at tip-toe stance ne er quite knoing
what to expect next, and plagued with inner fears and outer resentments: when you are foreer
fighting a degenerating sense of "nobodiness": then you will understand why %%e find it difficult
to wait.
Id. at 76-77.
224. Id. at 88.
225. MARK TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW" TIILRGOOD MARSHALL AD THE SLPRF-%IE
CouRT, 1936-1961, at 260 (1994). King, in contrast, was "greatly disappointed ssith the %%hite church and
its leadership." King, supra note 219, at 83.
226. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITLTON IN CONFLICT 354-55. 372-73 (1992)
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so strenuously. In short, as in the federalist defense of Barnette in light of the
violence that occurred after Gobitis, here local identities provide resources for
social transformation to the extent that those identities draw some meaning
from universal commitments.227 That, I believe, comes close to describing
the right kind of complex cosmopolitanism.
B. Complex Cosmopolitanism and Gay Rights
Sandel's discussion of gay rights illustrates the tension between his interest
in federalism as a location for value pluralism and his conventionally liberal
views on many specific issues. Sandel criticizes the dissenters in Bowers v.
Hardwick2 8 for appealing to a "voluntarist" argument that "heterosexual
intimacies" resemble "homosexual intimacies" because of "the autonomy the
practices reflect. ' 229 The voluntarist approach "holds that people should be
free to choose their intimate associations for themselves., 230 The voluntarist
approach is defective, Sandel argues, for two reasons. First, "as a practical
matter, it is by no means clear that social cooperation can be secured on the
strength of autonomy rights alone, absent some measure of agreement on the
moral permissibility of the practices at issue. '23' In addition, the voluntarist
case secures toleration for gays, but at the cost of analogizing it to other
"base" activities that take place in private: The analogy "tolerates
homosexuality at the price of demeaning it."'232 Whatever gains gays obtain
through voluntarist arguments are "thin and fragile. 233
In contrast, a substantive approach "claims that much that is valuable in
conventional marriage is also present in homosexual unions. '"234 The
difficulty, of course, lies in securing agreement with those claims. "Much,"
after all, is not "all." Catholic natural lawyers are familiar with the move
Sandel commends: Citing the lower court's opinion in Bowers, Sandel notes
that "[t]he marital relationship is significant ... not only because of its
procreative purpose but also 'because of the unsurpassed opportunity for
mutual support and self-expression that it provides.' ' 235 Catholic natural
lawyers would raise their eyebrows at that use of "unsurpassed," arguing
227. I would be entering waters beyond my depth to suggest how local identities support universal
commitments. I note only that Rawls's construction, in which principles of political liberalism arise in the
first instance from within each comprehensive view only to be transformed by the experience of stability,
seems suggestive.
228. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
229. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 104.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 106.
232. Id. at 107.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 104.
235. Id. at 105 (quoting Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1211-12 (11 th Cir. 1985), aff d, 478
U.S. 186 (1986)).
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instead that the procreative potential of marital intimacy is an essential
characteristic of the human goods instantiated by sexual friendship?'1
What can we make of substantive arguments like these? One problem case
for Catholic natural lawyers is the marriage between two sixty-year-olds,
whose sexual intimacy has no procreative potential. These natural lawyers do
have answers to the problem case,2" but a detached observer might
justifiably believe that what she or he is reading is a simulacrum of a reasoned
23argument. 38 Unless one had a prior commitment to the proposition that
homosexual intimacy is worse than heterosexual intimacy, one would be
unlikely to find the arguments persuasive.
There are, however, two sides to this observation. First, it relies on
universal standards to determine what human goods homosexual intimacy
embodies, expresses, or instantiates. To the extent that Sandel believes that we
should make substantive arguments that he expects to have persuasive force,
he is committed to a form of universalism; perhaps not the universalism of the
procedural republic and its exclusive commitment to autonomy-based
arguments, but a universalism of some sort nonetheless. Once again, we see
how complex cosmopolitanism may be needed to support Sandel's conclusions.
Second, if Sandel believes that controversies over gay rights can be
resolved by substantive arguments, he cannot really be committed to the
"unrealized possibilities implicit in American federalism."2 9 For federalism
is defensible, and interesting, only to the extent that it entails a genuine value
pluralism.24 In a truly federal system, the people of Georgia and New York
would be allowed to say, "We understand-but simply disagree with-the
substantive arguments you have made about the human goods of homosexual
and heterosexual intimacy," and bar or allow homosexual sodomy accordingly.
From within their forms of reasoning, the arguments are fully reasoned; only
an observer applying some universal standard can question whether they have
offered reasons for their public policy.24'
236. For a recent presentation, see Robert P. George & Gerard V Brad). Marrige and the Liberal
Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301 (1995) (responding to Stephen Macedo's critique against their .icw that
"sodomy ... is intrinsically nonmarital and immoral-).
237. The answers require specification of marriage (and sexual intimac)) as a "t) pc The general
characteristics of participants in marriage must be such that participants of that typc hae the potential for
procreation, even if particular participants may not.
238. Louis Michael Seidman forcefully urged this point on me
239. SANDEL, supra note 3, at 347.
240. For me, the most powerful recent presentation of the point can be found in Ed%%ard L Rubin &
Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis. 41 IUCLA L. REv 903 ( 1994). although
I acknowledge that my reading of the article is not widely shared
241. The Tennessee Court of Appeals invalidated the state's Homosexual Practices Act as a %tolation
of state constitutional guarantees of privacy, describing the challenger's arguments. %lnich the court
accepted, as follows: '[M]ajoritarian morality is not a valid basis for curtailing the actions of an unpopular
minority in the absence of any evidence that the actions of the minority harm other members of socicty"
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). it vould be interesting to to to tigure
out whether, based on Sandel's analysis, this is an appropriate use of the pluralism that federalism allot%,
or whether it is inappropriate because it relies on autonomy arguments. I simply do not know
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More generally, reasons for or against a practice can be offered from
outside or from within a community. If they come from outside, they will
invoke standards that are universal relative to that community. If they come
from inside, there are two possibilities. The critical standards might be
available from within every community's commitments. Then, however, it
really does look as if we are dealing with a Rawlsian overlapping consensus.
If, in contrast, communities are truly locations of value pluralism, some
communities will reject some reasons offered against their practices.
Sandel's description of republican politics as "risky" indicates his
awareness of this difficulty.242 The risk Sandel addresses is coercion. I doubt,
however, that he thinks coercion as such is problematic. All political outcomes
are either coercive or consensual, and if the latter, we are again in Rawlsian
territory. 43 The risk of republican politics, then, is that it will produce
coercion into wrong practices. But it is unclear to me where Sandel can get his
criteria for assessing practices except from some principles that are, once
again, universal relative to the communities that reject them. They are, in short,
the cosmopolitan dimensions of an adequate public philosophy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sandel's interest in federalism calls to mind two songs entitled "Small
Town." For John Cougar Mellencamp, "I can be myself here in this small
town. And people let me be just what I want to be." '244 For Lou Reed and
John Cale, recollecting Andy Warhol's life, "When you're growing up in a
small town, bad skin, bad eyes-gay and fatty, people look at you funny when
you're in a small town .... There's only one good thing about a small town,
you know that you want to get out."245 Alas, both songs are accurate. Small
towns have many attractive characteristics; they also have many unattractive
ones. In that, they do not differ from our public life more generally.
Small towns and indeed all the institutions of civil society are complicated
locations for the development of public philosophies. Had Sandel examined the
"public philosophy" of United States churches by looking at religious doctrine
and historical practice, he would have found parallels to his procedural
republic in modernist and liberation theology. Novels like Barchester
Towers,246 Go Tell It on the Mountain,247 and, on a less exalted level,
242. See SANDEL, supra note 3, at 321.
243. Cf id. at 320 ("Unlike Rousseau's unitary vision, the republican politics Tocqueville describes
is more clamorous than consensual.").
244. JOHN COUGAR MELLENCAMP, Small Town, on SCARECROW (Polygram Records 1985). The lyrics
are also available at <http://sprice.evansville.edul-tb8/mellencamp/smalljown.html>.
245. Lou REED & JOHN CALE, Small Town, on SONGS FOR DRELLA (Sire Records 1990).
246. ANTHONY TROLLOPE, BARCHESTER TOWERS (Trollope Soc'y 1995) (1857).
247. JAMES BALDWIN, GO TELL IT ON THE MOUNTAIN (1953).
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Harry Kemelman's Rabbi Small mysteries28 show how churches reproduce
within themselves the complex relations that characterize the societies in which
they are located.4 9 How could they not? People bring to the institutions of
civil society their thick personalities, not "thin" ones associated solely with
each institution's mission. That mission influences the way people interact,
which is why a person may behave one way in the local Wal-Mart, another
way in the polling booth, and yet another way as a volunteer in his or her
church's soup kitchen. The philosophies that result from those interactions will
therefore differ. But I suspect that in any society the philosophies will bear a
family resemblance to each other. If so, revitalizing the institutions of civil
society may only reproduce the dilemmas with which Sandel is concerned.
What public philosophy would be compatible with the multiple identities
we all have? It seems to me that here Rawls has the advantage over Sandel.
As I understand the Rawlsian argument, the overlapping consensus results from
a complex process arising in the first instance from within each person's thick
identity. Each person can adhere to it and give it the sort of allegiance that
Sandel believes a public philosophy must have for it to motivate public action,
precisely because it is compatible with every thick identity.
The professional-managerial class will almost certainly play a large part
in any political effort to secure public regulation of transnational corporate
power. Sandel's diagnosis of that class's discontent is valuable. I believe that
a complex cosmopolitanism may be more effective than Sandel's more
restrained approach in providing it with a public philosophy to justify
controlling corporate power. And, precisely because complex cosmopolitanism
is a form of universalism, it holds out the possibility of appealing to other
classes as well. 50
As we have seen, an important element in Sandel's account of a decent
public philosophy is that it generate and support the conditions for its
reproduction. That, however, is not quite right. Rather, a decent public
philosophy must generate and support the conditions for its reproduction or
transformation into a social order at least as good as the one in which the
public philosophy is located. :5' A decent public philosophy should have the
resources to correct itself, and the social order it describes and supports, when
the social order appears to be on a bad course.5 2 The plural and complex
248. See, e.g., HARRY KEMELMAN, THAT DAY TIE RABBI LEi-TOw\ (1996) Kcmclman has %nttcn
II other novels in this series.
249. In citing these works, I exploit serious and less serious literature for a didactic purpose far more
limited than the ways in which the serious works can contnbute to enlightenment and edification
250. I hope that my formulation is appropriately cautious in light of the experience of the imaginary
international proletarian class.
251. This formulation allows for the possibilities that a good social order may c%ol'c into a better one.
and that the social order may oscillate from one good form to another.
252. The ability to correct deviations need not create a completely homeostatic system because there
is at least a theoretical possibility that the corrections will set the social order in the direction of a
beneficial-or at least a nonharmful--transformation.
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public philosophy in the United States, which Sandel's account reveals despite
his effort to simplify in a way that captures the interests of the professional-
managerial class, may be precisely that.
